Assuming we don't have free will, why do we have the illusion that we do?
Three possibilities come to mind:
Is there an evolutionary purpose?
Does it arise as a consequence of our mental activities, a sort of side effect of our thinking?
Is it given a priori (something we have to think in order to think at all)?
EDIT: Thanks for all the responses! Just one thing I saw come up a few times I'd like to address: a lot of people are asking 'Why assume this?' The answer is: it's purely rhetorical! That said, I'm happy with a well thought-out 'I dispute the premiss' answer.
Look at split-brain patients: divide the corpus callosum down the middle, and you effectively have two separate brains that don't communicate. Tell the half without the speech centre to perform some random task, then ask the other one why they did that - and they will flat-out make up some plausible sounding reason.
And the thing is, they haven't the slightest idea that it isn't true. To them, it feels exactly like freely choosing to do it, for those made up reasons.
Bits of our brains make us do stuff for their own reasons, and we just make shit up to explain it after the fact. We invent the memory of choosing, about a quarter of a second after we've primed our muscles to carry out the choice.
I think a chunk of this comes down to our need to model the thoughts of others (incredibly useful for social animals) - we make everyone out to be these monolithic executive units so that we can predict their actions, and we make ourselves out to be the same so we can slot ourselves into that same reasoning.
Also it would be a bit fucking terrifying to just constantly get surprised by your own actions, blown around like a leaf on the wind without a clue what's going on, so I think another chunk of it is just larping this "I" person who has a coherent narrative behind it all, to protect your own sanity.
I like to look at the illusion of free will as if you're falling down a pit. You can try to flap your arms or swim, and maybe move yourself a little bit, but at the end, you're still falling down.
Warning, I came up with this while very high one time, lol, but it's kind of stuck with me:
Consciousness is a 4-dimensional construct living in a 3-dimensional world. What we experience as the passage of time is just our consciousness traveling/falling along the surface of the 4-dimensional plane/shape that defines our existence.
Feel free to poke all the holes you want in that. lol
There is an old Taoist story about two people floating down a river. One has already decided where he wants the river to take him and is constantly swimming against the current to try to get there, the other just floats along taking in the sights.
They both end up wherever the river takes them, and they both went through the same obstacles and rapids, but when asked how the trip was, one of them is complaining about the whole trip being frustrating and exhausting, while the other had a pleasant time and tells you all about the amazing things they saw on the way.
Here's my take: the answer is emergent phenomena. We live in a very complex system and in complex systems there are interactions that can only be predicted using systems of equal or higher complexity. So even in case everything is predetermined, it would still be unpredictable and therefore your decisions are basically still up to you and the complex interactions in your brain.
I think this is probably it. I think this argument is strongly related to the idea of consciousness as an emergent property of sensory experience. I find it simple to imagine the idea of a body with no will or no consciousness (i.e., a philosophical zombie). But I find it very difficult, almost impossible, in fact, to imagine a consciousness with no will, even if it's only the will to think a given thought.
Do we have free will to think a given thought? All of my thoughts just suddenly appear in my mind or are connected to previous thoughts that suddenly appeared in my mind.
If you throw a pair of dice, do they still have to roll if their final positions are predetermined from the point that you let go?
One view is that even a deterministic mind still must execute. An illusion of the capacity to choose between multiple options might be necessary to considering those options which leads to the unavoidable conclusion.
A better question is, is there any difference between the illusion of free will and actual free will. Is there some experiment you could conduct to tell the difference?
If it's the illusion of free will then whoever constructed it most likely made sure we wouldn't have access to those kinds of experiments, or we wouldn't think of or choose to do them.
Our brains cannot store all the experiences we ever make. It rather only stores 'hunches' (via many weightings of neurons). In particular, it also mixes multiple experiences together to reinforce such hunches.
This means that despite there being causal reasons why you might e.g. feel uneasy around big dogs, your brain will likely only reproduce a hunch, a gut feeling of fear.
And then because you don't remember the concrete causal reasons, it feels like a decision to follow your hunch to get the hell out of there.
This feeling of making a decision is made even stronger, because there isn't just the big-dog-bad-hunch, but also the don't-show-fear-to-big-dog-hunch and the I'm-in-a-social-situation-and-it-would-be-rude-to-leave-hunch and many others.
There is just an insane amount of past experiences and present sensory input, which makes it impossible to trace back why you would decide a certain way. This gives the illusion of there being no reasons, of free will.
You're conscious of the decisions you make. Sure they're the result of a million different variables, chemicles, memories, and predetermined traits, but some of that is active. You are making the choice. Whether you could have made a different one or not doesn't affect what the choice feels like
I have heard somewhere that some people seemed to believe that behind each human's actions, there is some kind of "daemon" that is invisible, but moving the humans like puppets.
This is conceptualized in the theater mask, through which one can speak.
The daemon speaks through the human as a theater actor would speak through a mask. (The latin word for that mask is "persona" (literally "sound-through") and that's why we call a person a person today (because they are controlled by a daemon who speaks through them)).
As to why our brains have a process that gives us a perception of free will, that's a much harder question that i think science currently only has conjecture on. If i had to guess I'd guess that either there's an evolutionary advantage to it, or it's an emergent property that arises from all the parts of the brain being connected in the way they are
I forget which philosopher said this but he said something along the lines of if you have the desire and the capacity for an action you do, then deterministic or not, you chose that action. If the tide pulls me where I was already swimming, I still chose to swim there, even if some other force took me half of the way.
But where does your desire and capacity to do that thing come from? It arises from the physical arrangement of neurons/hormones/etc. in your brain and body
Just going to throw out a really good read: Determined by Robert Sapolky. (Behave is also really good.)
He doesn't really convince me of the core thesis that free will doesn't exist, or that some of his proposed changes to the legal system to "recognize the absence of free will" in the second half are good courses of action, but he does do a great job of demonstrating what makes us tick from a variety of lenses, how much environmental factors play a role in behavior, and generally arguing to approach people with more empathy and recognition that we might be more like them in a similar situation than we think.
(It is heavy. It's long and goes into some depth on different fields. But he lays out the main ideas you need to know and doesn't assume that much knowledge, just a will to learn.)
I read a fucking lot of books about what makes us tick. Behave is (tied for) my favorite. He does actually hint down the determinism path a little in behave, but he goes all in on Determined.
I would still probably generally recommend Behave over Determined, but Determined is directly relevant to the OP.
Roger Penrose is pretty much the only dude looking into consciousness from the perspective of a physicist
He thinks consciousness has to do with "quantum bubble collapse" happening inside our brains at a very very tiny level.
That's the only way free will could exist.
If consciousness is anything else, then everything is predetermined.
Like, imagine dropping a million bouncy balls off the hoover dam. You'll never get the same results twice.
However, that's because you'll never get the same conditions twice.
If the conditions are exactly the same down to an atomic level... You'll get the same results every time
What would give humans free will would be the inherent randomness if the whole "quantum bubble collapse" was a fundamental part of consciousness.
That still wouldn't guarantee free will, but it would make it possible.
There's also the whole thing where what we think of as our consciousness isn't actually running the show. It's just a narrator that's summarizing everything up immediately after it happened. What's actually calling the shot is other parts of our brains, neurons in our gut, and what controls our hormones.
We don't know if that's not true either. But if it was, each person as a thing would have free will, it's just what we think of as that person does not have free will.
Sounds batshit crazy and impossible, until you read up on the studies on people who had their brains split in half at different stages of mental development.
There's a scary amount of shit we don't know about "us". And an even scarier amount we don't know about how much variation there is with all that
Roger Penrose is pretty much the only dude looking into consciousness from the perspective of a physicist
I would recommend reading the philosophers Jocelyn Benoist and Francois-Igor Pris who argue very convincingly that both the "hard problem of consciousness" and the "measurement problem" stem from the same logical fallacies of conflating subjectivity (or sometimes called phenomenality) with contextuality, and that both disappear when you make this distinction, and so neither are actually problems for physics to solve but are caused by fallacious reasoning in some of our a priori assumptions about the properties of reality.
Benoist's book Toward a Contextual Realism and Pris' book Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics both cover this really well. They are based in late Wittgensteinian philosophy, so maybe reading Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a good primer.
That’s the only way free will could exist...What would give humans free will would be the inherent randomness if the whole “quantum bubble collapse” was a fundamental part of consciousness.
Even if they discover quantum phenomena in the brain, all that would show is our brain is like a quantum computer. But nobody would argue quantum computers have free will, do they? People often like to conflate the determinism/free will debate with the debate over Laplacian determinism specifically, which should not be conflated, as randomness clearly has nothing to do with the question of free will.
If the state forced everyone into a job for life the moment they turned 18, but they chose that job using a quantum random number generator, would it be "free"? Obviously not. But we can also look at it in the reverse sense. If there was a God that knew every decision you were going to make, would that negate free will? Not necessarily. Just because something knows your decision ahead of time doesn't necessarily mean you did not make that decision yourself.
The determinism/free will debate is ultimately about whether or not human decisions are reducible to the laws of physics or not. Even if there is quantum phenomena in the brain that plays a real role in decision making, our decisions would still be reducible to the laws of physics and thus determined by them. Quantum mechanics is still deterministic in the nomological sense of the word, meaning, determinism according to the laws of physics. It is just not deterministic in the absolute Laplacian sense of the word that says you can predict the future with certainty if you knew all properties of all systems in the present.
If the conditions are exactly the same down to an atomic level… You’ll get the same results every time
I think a distinction should be made between Laplacian determinism and fatalism (not sure if there's a better word for the latter category). The difference here is that both claim there is only one future, but only the former claims the future is perfectly predictable from the states of things at present. So fatalism is less strict: even in quantum mechanics that is random, there is a single outcome that is "fated to be," but you could never predict it ahead of time.
Unless you ascribe to the Many Worlds Interpretation, I think you kind of have to accept a fatalistic position in regards to quantum mechanics, mainly due not to quantum mechanics itself but special relativity. In special relativity, different observers see time passing at different rates. You can thus build a time machine that can take you into the future just by traveling really fast, near the speed of light, then turning around and coming back home.
The only way for this to even be possible for there to be different reference frames that see time pass differently is if the future already, in some sense, pre-exists. This is sometimes known as the "block universe" which suggests that the future, present, and past are all equally "real" in some sense. For the future to be real, then, there has to be an outcome of each of the quantum random events already "decided" so to speak. Quantum mechanics is nomologically deterministic in the sense that it does describe nature as reducible to the laws of physics, but not deterministic in the Laplacian sense that you can predict the future with certainty knowing even in principle. It is more comparable to fatalism, that there is a single outcome fated to be (that is, again, unless you ascribe to MWI), but it's impossible to know ahead of time.
Even if they discover quantum phenomena in the brain
There 100% are...
Penrose thinks they're responsible for consciousness.
Because we also don't know what makes anesthesia stop consciousness. And anesthesia stops consciousness and stops the quantum process.
Now, the math isn't clean. I forget which way it leans, but I think it's that consciousness kicks out a little before the quantum action is fully inhibited?
It's been a minute, and this shit isn't simple.
Unless you ascribe to the Many Worlds Interpretation
This is incompatible with that.
It's the quantum wave function collapse that's important. There's no spinning out where multiple things happen, there is only one thing. After wave collapse, is when you look in the box and see if the cats dead.
In a sense it's the literal "observer effect" happening our head.
And that is probably what consciousness is.
It'll just take a while till we can prove it. And Penrose will probably be dead by then. But so was Einstein before Penrose proved most of his shit was true
That's how science works. Most won't know who Penrose is till he's dead.
Even if the brain is a quantum computer, it's quantum dice rolls controlling your neurons. So quantum consciousness doesn't enable the possibility free will.
I personally think the debate over the existence of Free Will is simply an extraordinary debate over semantics.
If you look at a human being from its basic biological and cellular makeup, a human being is a walking bundle of competing desires that appears to present itself as a single cohesive corporate entity.
The people who are against the concept of free will say that because you have innate desires for food sex and entertainment, that you have no choice to not act upon those in a desires and therefore any delusion that you carry about the choices that you make being done of an entirely unencumbered and Free Will are false.
Then there are people who say that Free Will doesn't exist for religious purposes, that God is an all-knowing creature who knows the beginning and the end and everything in between and so you cannot make a choice that he or she or it does not already know that you will make and therefore your choices are not free.
The people who say Free Will does exist on a biological level will point to people who choose to self-immolate or to starve themselves to death in protest of a spiritual or psychological issue, valuing the ideals that life has imprinted upon them over the biological necessities of continuing to live.
The people who say Free Will does exist on a spiritual level say many things, such as we carry a spark of the Divine in us and therefore we are as little gods ourselves, capable of creating and destroying in roughly the same proportional magnitude as the greater gods above are, or they say that since we have the ability to make choices and we are judged by those choices than our choices must be free otherwise judgment is meaningless.
I personally tend to lean into the Free Will side, while understanding simultaneously that sometimes there are exigencies that induce us to choose one option over another on a more likely than not basis, or to phrase it another way, our will is as free as we choose it to be.
The people who are against the concept of free will say that because you have innate desires for food sex and entertainment, that you have no choice to not act upon those in a desires and therefore any delusion that you carry about the choices that you make being done of an entirely unencumbered and Free Will are false.
That's not the argument against free will. The argument is just that there's a physical process to every thought in your head. When you think of a tree, inside your brain a specific pattern of neurons and chemical messengers activate which is what creates the thought of a tree.
When you're consciously deciding whether to eat a donut or a salad, a specific pattern of neurons and chemical messengers are the mechanism by which that decision process is occurring. The pattern of neurons and chemical messengers happening in your brain is the physical mechanism that is performing the decision making process.
There are no thoughts outside of the ones generated by your neurons and chemical messengers. The pattern of neurons and chemical messengers IS the thought that you're thinking. Your brain (and the thoughts that occur within it) is a physical object that obeys the laws of nature, the same as all physical objects do.
I think you've mischaracterized the arguments of the "no free will" camp, or at least omitted a major argument. You may find this interesting https://youtu.be/eELfSwqJNKU
Assuming we don't have free will, why do we have the illusion that we do?
You experience the world through your senses.
What sense that your body has would you expect to give your brain a different set of inputs if your brain's actions were not deterministic, not set by the laws of physics? How would you expect it to feel different?
You wouldn't expect to feel like some invisible force is in control of your limbs, which I think is perhaps what some people intuitively expect if someone says that their actions are pre-determined.
It's not talking about anything that your brain can sense; it's talking about how your brain works.
And to take a slightly different tack, if the biochemical and electrical activity in your brain were not deterministic, how would you ever know? It's one thing to believe that you made a decision on your own "Free Will", but how could you possibly rewind the entire universe (or at least some sufficiently small portion of it), including your brain's exact atomic state, and re-run the experiment to know for sure? At that point, what would "Free Will" even mean?
There are many thing my body does which I'm aware of, but that I don't will, and others that I have some control over, i.e., my will appears to play a role, but not the only role.
I don't think it creates any kind of contradiction to suggest that, hypothetically, there could be more (or less) of either of those types of things, without my perceiving an invisible (external) force of some kind to be involved. After all, I don't ascribe my heartbeat to an external force, but I am aware that I don't will it.
After all, I don’t ascribe my heartbeat to an external force, but I am aware that I don’t will it.
No, but you have the ability to sense your heartbeat, so you can tell that it's there.
You don't have the ability to sense electromagnetic emissions in the X-ray frequency range, so you can't tell that they're there. You wouldn't know if X-rays of a given intensity were present at a given moment. It's like asking "why is there the illusion that there are no X-rays" when you wouldn't expect to feel differently regardless of their presence or non-presence.
Determinism seems reasonable only because people have an inaccurately simplistic conception of causation, such that they believe that consciousness and choice violate it, rather than being a part of it.
Causation isn't a simple linear thing - it's an enormously complex web in which any number of things can be causes and/or effects of any number of things.
Free will (properly understood) is just one part of that enormously complex web.
Because there are points at which, exactly as seems to be the case, we consciouly choose to follow one particular path in spite of the fact that we could just as easily have chosen another.
Yes, there's an evolutionary purpose for the concept of purpose. If you believe you can do something and show some initiative then you're more likely to get it. The early bird gets the worm, and the bird that anticipated the worm is the early bird. This is true both for humans and cells in a petri dish.
I think its because we're only just now coming to terms with the fact that we're simply a collection of desires, the culture we were born to and stories we tell ourselves. In keeping, we had to have a story to tell ourselves and free will existing is the more compelling of the two.
I don't think there's an evolutionary purpose. To me, we just became far more self aware than our limited knowledge of the world we find ourself in could cope with and its more of a coping mechanism than anything else.
Anyone who says we don’t have free will can come up with a thousand reasons we don’t.
Anyone who says we do have free will can come up with a thousand reasons we do.
It really doesn’t matter. All I know is that if I wanted to go on a murderous rampage, I could. I choose not to. For me, that means that I currently have control over myself and my actions. And on the same token, there is so much outside of my control that affects my trajectory in this life.
So there are illusions if you allow there to be. To me, we both have and don’t have free will depending on context.
It seems to me that the question of free will is only truly meaningful (aside from being an interesting thought experiment) if we could then perfectly or near-perfectly predict what a person will do. But the system in which we exist is so complex that we will never be able to model that or come close.
So we might as well consider humans to have free will, just as we consider a roll of the dice to be random.
Things can be true on different levels and false on others. The earth is locally flat, it is as a whole a near sphere.
I don't know if we have free will or not, I strongly suspect that physics can explain our minds fully, but I don't know. At the same time even if physics could fully explain our minds in practice we are so complicated we give the impression that we have a limited amount of free will. So yeah the earth is round but it is easier for us to assume flat most of the time.
Look into Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem, and the philosophical implications of that.
A lot of times, when we're dealing with the assertion that we don't have free will, we're analyzing that according to rule-based systems. The system that we use to evaluate truth isn't entirely rule-based, and is necessarily a superset of what we can consciously evaluate.
In effect, some less-complex system that is a subset of your larger mind is saying 'you have limits, and they are this.' But your larger mind disagrees, because that more rule-based subset of rights is incapable of knowing the limits of its superset. Though, we just feel like it's 'off'.
If it feels like it's off, there's a good chance that the overall way you're thinking of it isn't right, even if the literal thing you're focused on has some degree of truth.
In short, it's possible to know something that is technically true, but that isn't interpreted correctly internally.
If you accept the model that you have no free will without processing the larger feelings it evokes, then whether or not your internal sense of free will is rule-based, you'll artificially limit the way you think to filter out the internal process you think of as free will. ..and that can have massive consequences for your happiness and viability as an organism, because you've swapped away that which you actually are for labels and concepts of what you are - but your concept is fundamentally less complex and led capable than you are as a whole.
Fortunately, rule-based systems break when faced with reality. It's just that it can be very painful to go through that process with what you identify with.
I don't believe there is an "illusions that we have free will," either. Honestly, "illusions" don't really even exist as they're traditionally talked about. People say if you place a stick in a cup of water, there is an "illusion" created that the stick is bent. But is there? What you see is just what a non-bent stick looks like in a cup of water. Its appearance is different from one out of water due to light refraction. It's not as if reality is tricking you by showing you a bent stick when there isn't one, that's just what a non-bent stick in water really looks like.
The only "illusion" is your own faulty interpretation of what you are seeing, which upon further inspection you may later find it is wrong and change your mind. There was simply no illusion there to begin with. Reality just presents itself as it actually exists, and it is us who interpret it, and sometimes we make mistakes and interpret it wrong. But it's not reality's fault we interpret it wrong sometimes. Reality is not wrong, nor is it right. It just is what it is.
In a similar sense, there is just no "illusion of free will." Neural networks are pattern recognition machines. We form models of the external world which can approximate different counterfactual realities, and we consider those realities to decide which one will optimize whatever goal we're trying to achieve. The fact we can consider counterfactual worlds doesn't mean that those counterfactual worlds really exist, and indeed our very consideration of them is part of the process of determining which decision we make.
Reality never tricks us into the counterfactual worlds really do in some way exist and we are selecting from these possible worlds. That's just an interpretation we sometimes impose artificially, but honestly I think it's exaggerated how much of an "illusion" this really is. A lot of regular people if you talk to them will probably admit quite easily that those counterfactual worlds don't exist anywhere but in their imagination, and that of course the only thing real is the decision that they made and the world they exist within where they made that decision.
Hence, reality is not in any way tricking us into thinking our decisions somehow have more power than they really do. It is some of us (not all of us, I'm not even convinced it's most of us) who impose greater powers to decision making than it actually has. There just is no "illusion of free will," at best there is your personal misinterpretation of what decision making actually entails.
That would seem like more of a question of sociology and history, studying why certain cultures develop the ideas they do, and it probably would not be the same for every culture. Not really a question that I have the proper expertise on to answer.
That's a very large assumption. The simplest explanation is that we feel like we have free will because we do. Quantum mechanics suggests some major challenges to determinism, and the best arguments to restore it require a very unsatisfying amount of magical thinking.
Why are we assuming we don't have free will? We do. Its not total freedom, our freedom is contingent on existing circumstances, but hard determinism is easily disprovable.
The idea that there is no free will is a mind fuck that keeps you from questioning your reality. You might as well ask, "assuming the earth is flat, why does the stick disappear on the horizon?"
Noone believes that people have full freedom with no context, no extenuating circumstances. What makes arguments like this seem convincing is how uncommon it is for people to think dialectically.
To the hard deterministic explanation that "something always came before," it asks "what is the role of the individual in history?"
This excerpt isn't a substitute for reading the whole essay but it makes a point pretty concisely:
But let us return to our subject. A great man is great not because his personal qualities give individual features to great historical events, but because he possesses qualities which make him most capable of serving the great social needs of his time, needs which arose as a result of general and particular causes. Carlyle, in his well-known book on heroes and hero-worship, calls great men beginners. This is a very apt description. A great man is precisely a beginner because he sees further than others, and desires things more strongly than others. He solves the scientific problems brought up by the preceding process of intellectual development of society; he points to the new social needs created by the preceding development of social relationships; he takes the initiative in satisfying these needs. He is a hero. But he is not a hero in the sense that he can stop, or change, the natural course of things, but in the sense that his activities are the conscious and free expression of this inevitable and unconscious course. Herein lies all his significance; herein lies his whole power. But this significance is colossal, and the power is terrible.
Perhaps it is the illusion of choice and the choice you make was always going to be that one due to all of the events that shaped you and the events that shaped the people that shaped you etc all the way back to the big bang.
Simple: We cannot predict the future. If you don't know what's going to happen nor whether it is being controlled, you do not know whether your actions are predetermined. Every movement you make might be the result of universal programming. What I'm typing, have sent, and you are reading might be the sequence of events that was always supposed to happen.
Free will is, IMO, as unknowable as whether an almighty being exists. That "almighty being" might have created this existence, but might also exist in its own realm that was created by another "almighty being". The chain might be infinite and it might not be. Asking these questions is like asking "can we reach infinity".