Wi-Fi jamming to knock out cameras suspected in nine Minnesota burglaries -- smart security systems vulnerable as tech becomes cheaper and easier to acquire
And that’s why hardlining is still by far the best option available.
Hardlined cameras need to be physically accessed and the cables snipped in order to disrupt them, and most cameras offering hardlining now feed Ethernet through their bases, providing additional protection.
Most sub-20 camera systems can run for up to an hour or two on a 500VA UPS, and up to a week or more with PowerWall backups, defeating intentional power outages.
A fully airgapped system can defeat any sort of direct Internet intrusion.
Shielded Ethernet can help protect from crosstalk attacks provided they are correctly grounded with the appropriate switches.
Hardware auth between cameras and the DVR can help defend against direct attacks via an unplugged cable or an open wall jack, in that only approved hardware can make the needed connections with either end.
Encrypted communications between cameras and DVR can enhance the security of data across the wire.
A brace of identical dummy cameras - similarly powered, if they have external indicators - alongside real ones will waste the time and effort of attackers who conduct physical attacks, while keeping recording-infrastructure needs to a minimum.
Bonus if identical but “dark” Ethernet is similarly spoofed throughout the building, as not only will it confuse physical attackers, but it’ll also be already in-place for future communications-infrastructure improvements.
DVR needs to be in a secured location, ideally fireproof. In combination with № 7 and № 8, a dummy DVR (with live screens showing actual content) can exist elsewhere to distract any physical attackers.
Sure, this list isn’t 100% coverage, but it gets you nearly there with a minimum of effort.
If you are in the middle of a frame-off gut of a home, as I currently am, much of this is trivial to implement.
A notoriously low-effort endeavor in itself.
"It's doable with a minimum of effort as long as you have your house gutted down to the foundations" isn't exactly the shining defense of "a minimum of effort" that I expected to read
I had to buy almost $500 of mdf to get around my attic well enough to pull cable for backhaul. It's not as easy as you make it sound in a lot of cases.
You have completely missed the point of attics not always being very accessible in order to argue for no good reason.
Yes, I would. The respirator type mask which you require in that environment is very stuffy and tough on someone like me who has a lung condition.
It being tiny makes it more inaccessible than the need for a mask does. The opening into the attic is narrow. I can fit through it, but most Americans would not be able to. Once up there, you have to crawl. I have a medical condition affecting my muscles which makes it exceedingly difficult to crawl.
Point is, once again, that not all attics are accessible. This isn't a discussion about masks.
Right, and always remember they’ll go for the easy win first. First choice is likely walk in an unlocked door, then kick in one not visible from the street, or if you really want in, break a window.
The thing is, even if you get a good shot of the person doing it, it probably can’t help find the person, only prove that it was them, if you find a suspect.
A better use is to get that early warning of what is happening as soon as it happens, and get a response going, but what’s the response time from your local police department? A smash and grab gets them on their way with your valuables, with very little chance of police getting there on time
That’s when we’re back to physical security and it may not be what you think. Can you reinforce your lock plate and door jamb to make it difficult, noisy, and time consuming to kick in a door? Are there windows they can easily get in and what can you do about that? Are there hidden places where they can break in without being seen? If a light suddenly comes on or alarm goes off, will they leave in case someone looks?