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Is problem receiving dirty money thanks to Haveno?
  • If so, then you can not say that Monero and fiat are separate.

    ?? Example Haveno: Ali from Istanbul sends Bob in Berlin 1000,- Eur. Only Ali and Bob know what the 1000.- euros are for.

    I am thinking about some KYC on a XMR buyer side along with some way XMR seller leave a review on a buyer in case trouble with fiat. The DEX I am unsure if supports KYC+feedback.

    The main point of Bisq & Haveno is NON KYC! "in case of trouble" That's what security deposit is for. It is punished with XMR. For this reason, very little fraud has occurred in the last 8 years.

    Somehow you contradict yourself. You want untraceable transactions first and then KYC.

    Every dollar in the world has been used by criminals to purchase weapons or drugs. Often even supported by governments. Cocaine can be detected on almost every euro note. Fiat is fungible & Monero is fungible. So who cares?

  • HavenoMain - Yet another instance of HavenoDex
  • https://github.com/haveno-dex/haveno/issues/987 (Monero misspelled twice) Are u/KTzer087 & u/haveno-user the HavenoMain scammers? Apparently they want Tether in Haveno but can't program it themselves. They probably can't do anything more than click the fork button and buy domains. ¯\(ツ)

  • 2024 Paper: How to De-Anonymize Monero on Tor
  • Yes, for years we in the Tor community have been trying to point out this to new relay operators: https://community.torproject.org/relay/technical-considerations/ Try to avoid the following hosters:

    • OVH SAS (AS16276)
    • Online S.a.s. (AS12876)
    • Hetzner Online GmbH (AS24940)
    • DigitalOcean, LLC (AS14061)
    • Frantech/BuyVM (AS53667) is also often full, because Francisco allows exits and he takes care of the abuse mail shit.

    Guards, bridges and middle relays can actually be operated at nearly any hoster. They don't get abuse and don't attract attention. It's difficult to find a hoster for an exit. It's best to have your own AS.

  • 2024 Paper: How to De-Anonymize Monero on Tor
  • In the Tor community we are considering how much a relay operator can have in total and where we draw the line. NTH currently has almost 20% exit traffic and we (5 orgs in an AS) have a bit more. https://nusenu.github.io/OrNetStats/

  • 2024 Paper: How to De-Anonymize Monero on Tor
  • And by sending a signal watermark embedded with the onion address to the Tor circuit, we establish a correlation between the onion address and IP address of a Monero Tor hidden service node

    And what does that achieve? He can also easily find my Monero node IP's + IPv6's + onion addresses in a Github issue and does not need research wodoo. ;-) He cannot see who connects his wallet there via Tor.

  • GrapheneOS Now Supports a Duress Reset PIN
  • The people Interpool is after don't need Duress. They simply refuse to give out their password. Current Pixel and iPhones phones cannt be cracked with forensic tools. https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/12848-claims-made-by-forensics-companies-their-capabilities-and-how-grapheneos-fares

  • GrapheneOS Now Supports a Duress Reset PIN
  • TBH, in order to be forced to unlock your phone under duress, you’d have to be a pretty high profile target.

    Why, that can happen to anyone at the airport when entering the USA, UK, Australia, etc. Or if you have been in a car accident, your cell phone will be confiscated in Germany, for example. Or when you were forced to unlock the phones and banking apps at gunpoint: https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/robbers-unlock-phones-banking-apps-gunpoint-bucktown-chicago/

  • This is how it's done. Use their own weapons against them.
  • You can have it done yourself at any stamp service. Monero Stamps