The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism by Gregory Bateson
The Cybernetics of “Self”: A Theory of Alcoholism by Gregory Bateson
In which Bateson argues that the efficacy of Alcoholics Anonymous is (in a Western, Cartesian context) comes at least in part from providing a more correct epistemology/ontology that subsumes a reified "self" into a larger system/circuit. The alcoholic is, by "hitting bottom," forced to shift from a destructive symmetrical to a complementary pattern of relation with the system.
Alcoholics Anonymous has not shown to have a particularly strong success with treating alcohol as a substance use disorder so the premise of this paper, which cites AA's own literature as reference, is based on nothing.
Good response, thank you! I found the article I posted interesting but I have no horse in the race about whether AA is effective or not. Seems pretty convincing that it isn't.
I find theorising addiction both unfortunately directly relevant and applicable and abstractly extremely interesting. I recently read an article which was satirical (but seemingly not entirely so) arguing that alcohol (and, consequently, addiction) is a disease of civilisation, Gilgamesh-style. But Amazonian foragers and horticulturalists (to my knowledge) get loaded on manioc beer (and seemingly did so before Old World contact), not to mention dolphins and elephants getting high on all kinds of shit. Fair enough that in a natural setting there are systemic limits on these things so addiction doesn't often arise. So, how, why? And what roles do different kinds of intoxication (or other non-intoxicating addictive states) play? A million questions for a million different answers, all important in their own way. Gets at the fundamental questions of pain and pleasure and why and how we do anything at all in life.
When it comes to the internal logic of the paper, I have a few questions:
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destructive schismogenesis is said to be possible either in symmetric or complementary modes. so if AA does promote an "almost entirely complementary" epistemology, (1) are there negative consequences? (2) is this realistic (even if more realistic than the cartesian reification of the self?) the author himself seems to beckon at a similar question at the end now that I look at it again
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also obviously I'm just getting into this discourse now & it's been going on a while so I wonder to what extent this binary has been elaborated upon in cybernetic theory
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